A popular technique for tolerating Byzantine faults in open distributed systems is to group machines into sets called quorums, each of which has an honest majority. These quorums are then used as basic building blocks to design systems that are robust to adversarial faults.
Introduction
Byzantine fault tolerance addresses the challenge of performing useful work when machines (nodes) in a system are malicious. Information routed through or stored at a faulty node can be discarded or corrupted, and tasks executed on such nodes may fail, or output an erroneous value. A popular technique for overcoming these challenges is to group nodes into sets called quorums, 1 where each has a non-faulty majority. We can then ensure the following.
• Computation is performed by all members of a quorum via protocols for Byzantine agreement (BA) or more general secure multiparty computation to guarantee that tasks execute correctly. In this way, each quorum simulates a reliable processor upon which jobs can be run.
• Fault-tolerant routing is also ensured. For quorums Q 1 and Q 2 along a route, each member of Q 1 can transmit messages to all members of Q 2 . This all-to-all exchange, followed by majority filtering by each node in Q 2 , guarantees correctness of communication between quorums. 2 The use of quorums provides a scalable approach to designing a robust distributed system, since they avoid the need to have all n nodes perform BA in concert, or communicate via a system-wide pairwise exchange of messages.
Quorums have been an active topic of research for more than a decade, with many intriguing theoretical results [7-9, 11, 17, 20, 21, 23, 27, 34, 36, 43, 49] . Yet, despite this progress, an enduring requirement is that each quorum contains Ω(log n) nodes.
Why does this logarithmic term matter? At first glance, it is an unlikely bottleneck. However, since quorums are building blocks for the system, their size |Q| greatly impacts important costs:
(i) Cost of Quorum Computation. Members of a quorum must often perform computation in concert.
Consequently, resource costs are a function of |Q|. For example, employing BA [24] [25] [26] or secure MPC [12] protocols will require poly(|Q|) messages.
(ii) Cost of Robust Routing. Routing via all-to-all exchange between two quorums incurs Ω(|Q| 2 ) message complexity. Given a route of length D, communication between any two quorums requires O(D|Q| 2 ) messages. 3 (iii) Cost of State Maintenance. Each node w must maintain state on all of its neighbors; this includes both the members of all quorums to which w belongs and the members of neighboring quorums. This requires storing link information, as well as periodically testing links for liveness. 4 In each case above, reducing |Q| would directly reduce cost. Unfortunately, for existing results, |Q| = Ω(log n) is key to ensuring (via a concentration result and union bound) that all quorums have a non-faulty majority with high probability (w.h.p.). 5 Without this property, all previous quorum constructions succumb to adversarial attack. Therefore, new ideas are required to decrease |Q|.
ε-Robustness
Consider a system of n nodes where a β-fraction suffer Byzantine faults. The following defines our notion of ε-robustness: For a small ε > 0, at least (1 − ε)n quorums have an honest majority and can robustly route messages to each other. Note that prior results fall under this definition when ε = 1/poly(n). For generality, the parameters β and ε are left unfixed, however, in order to employ BA protocols, typically β ≤ 1/4, and a small ε is desirable. We consider the following questions: Why is this a useful concept? Consider decentralized storage and retrieval of data. This definition guarantees all but an ε-fraction of data is reachable and maintained reliably. Example applications include distributed databases, name services, and content-sharing networks. Alternatively, consider n jobs in an open computing platform that are run on individual machines. This definition guarantees that all but an ε-fraction of those jobs can be correctly computed. 6 Why isn't satisfying this definition trivial? Given Θ(n) non-faulty nodes, this definition captures the natural goal of simulating (1 − ε)n reliable processors and being able to route information between those processors. If we ignore the use of quorums or, equivalently, consider quorums each consisting of a single node, then we trivially have (1 − β)n reliable processors. However, routing between them is challenging. For example, establishing links between each pair of nodes will give robust routing, but this is hardly scalable. Why don't previous solutions solve this problem? All prior results using quorums focus on the case where ε = 1/poly(n). In this case, routing is possible -albeit, costly -because w.h.p. all quorums have a majority of honest nodes and are, therefore, reliable.
To reduce cost, we consider ε = 1/poly(log n) and refer to this as almost-everywhere routing. This allows us to reduce the size of the quorum exponentially which yields cost savings. However, we lose the w.h.p. guarantee that all quorums have a majority of non-faulty nodes -indeed, w.h.p. there will be quorums that do not have such a majority-and this disqualifies prior solutions.
Related Work
Robustness via Quorums. The use of quorums for building robust distributed systems has received significant attention. Early results addressed robustness for ε = 1/poly(n) with poly(log n) cost assuming constraints on the amount of dynamism in the system [5, 16, 17, 21, 35] .
Full dynamism was achieved by Awerbuch and Scheideler in a series of breakthrough results [7] [8] [9] . In particular, the authors propose a cuckoo rule that w.h.p. preserves a good majority in each quorum over n Θ (1) join/leave operations when the total system size remains Θ(n). More recently, Guerraoui et al. [20] showed similar guarantees for systems that can vary polynomially in size.
An experimental evaluation of the cuckoo rule, along with proposed improvements, is given in [45] . The trade-off between quorum size and the level of robustness is examined, and findings suggest the approach can be practical to a point. For example, when n = 8, 192 and β ≈ 0.002, under the original cuckoo rule, |Q| = 64 suffices to preserve a good majority in each quorum for 100, 000 join/departure events; β ≈ 0.07 is possible with suggested improvements in [45] .
Several results have focused on reducing communication complexity, when the goodness of quorums is guaranteed (via an algorithm like the cuckoo rule) [43, 49] . However, here too, quorum size impacts performance and |Q| = 30 incurs significant latency in practice [49] . Quorums have also been used in conjunction with quarantining Byzantine nodes [27, 41] ; however, maintaining these quorums under churn remains an open problem. Robustness without Quorums. Other decentralized robust constructions exist that do not explicitly use quorums [13, 16, 42] . However, the associated techniques retain some form of Ω(log n) redundancy with regards to data placement or route selection and, therefore, incur poly(log n) cost.
Approaches described in [11, 23, 34] mitigate Byzantine faults by routing along multiple diverse routes. However, it is unclear that these systems can provide theoretical guarantees on robustness.
Central authorities (CAs) -sometimes referred to as a Configuration Service or Neighborhood Authority -have been used in prior results [11, 39, 40, 47 ] to achieve robustness. While our results can be used in conjunction with a CA, it is not always plausible to assume such an authority is available and immune to attack. For this reason, our work does not depend on a CA. Computational Puzzles. Proof-of-work (PoW) via computational puzzles has been used to mitigate the Sybil attack [14] whereby an adversary overwhelms a system with a large number of identifiers (IDs). We note that such PoW schemes have been proposed in decentralized settings such as DHTs (for example, see [29] ). However, such PoW schemes only limit the number of Sybil IDs -typically commensurate with the amount of computational power available to the adversary -and the problem of tolerating these adversarial IDs must still be addressed by other means (for example, see [44, 50] ).
A prominent example of how PoW can provide security is Bitcoin. However, note that the analysis of Bitcoin and related systems commonly assumes the existence of a communication protocol that allows a node to disseminate a value to all other nodes within a known bounded constant amount of time despite an adversary [19, 30, 32] . In contrast, our results do not assume the existence of such a protocol. Our work does, however, use computational puzzles to obtain a significant reduction in communication complexity and state maintenance.
Our Model and Preliminaries
A node is good if it obeys protocol, otherwise, the node is Byzantine or bad. For ease of exposition, we analyze a system where n nodes are always present even under churn; that is, when a node leaves, another is assumed to join. Our results hold when the system size is Θ(n) -that is, the size changes by a constant factor -but we omit these details in this extended abstract. The Adversary. At most βn nodes are bad and used by an adversary to attack the system where β < 1/4 is a positive constant. Critically, this implies robustness to Θ(n) Byzantine nodes which is asymptotically optimal. 7 Note that this is a powerful attack model since a single adversary allows the bad nodes to perfectly collude and coordinate their malicious actions. The adversary also knows the full network topology and the contents of all messages sent between nodes; however, the adversary does not have access to any random bits generated by a good node. Quorums. A quorum is a set of nodes; for our results, we assume each quorum has size Θ(log log n). Each node w has its own quorum Q w and w is referred to as the leader. A quorum Q is good if (i) d 1 ln ln n ≤ |Q| ≤ d 2 ln ln n for sufficiently large positive constants d 1 < d 2 , and (ii) the number of bad nodes in Q is at most (1 + δ)β|Q| for some tunably small constant δ > 0 depending only on n. Note that quorums are not necessarily disjoint; in addition to being the leader of Q w , node w may belong to other quorums. Quorum construction is described in Section 3.1. Input Graph. We assume an input graph, G on N nodes. 8 Given that each node has an ID u.a.r. in [0, 1) and there is no adversary, G satisfies the following properties with probability at least 1 − N −c for a tunable constant c ≥ 1:
• P1 -Search Functionality. There exists a search algorithm that, for any key value x, returns the node responsible for the corresponding resource (i.e., data item, computational job, shared network printer, etc.). A search requires traversing D = O(log N ) nodes.
• P2 -Load Balancing. A randomly chosen node is responsible for at most a (1 + δ)/n-fraction of the key values (and the corresponding resources) for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 depending on sufficiently large n.
• P3 -Linking Rules. Each node w links to nodes in a neighbor set L w and the rules for forming L w are known globally. Any node may determine the elements in L w by performing searches. 9 There are also O(poly(log N )) nodes whose IDs dictate that w is a neighbor (see the Appendix C). Again, any node may verify this by performing searches. The number of links on which a node is incident is the degree of w, and every node has the same degree asymptotically.
• P4 -Congestion Bound. The congestion is C ≤ polylog(N )/N where congestion is the maximum probability (over all nodes) that a node is traversed in a search initiated at a randomly chosen node for a randomly chosen point in [0, 1).
Note that G is not robust to bad nodes, but it does provide the underlying topology for our robust construction. For any G satisfying the above properties, our results apply. We emphasize that many constructions for G exist such as Chord [46] , the distance-halving construction in [36] , Viceroy [31] , Chord++ [4] , D2B [18] , FISSIONE [28] , and Tapestry [51] . Other non-DHT constructions with congestion bounds are also likely suitable input graphs, such as skip graphs [2, 3] and hyperrings [6] , where a membership vector or padding sequence is equivalent to an ID, respectively. In these latter constructions, nodes typically correspond to data items instead of machines; however, one can map data items to a network of nodes that preserves this topology [1] .
Node Identifiers and Proof-of-Work. Each node owns an ID which, for simplicity, is a value in [0, 1) (adequate precision is obtained using O(log n)). Important properties that our system guarantees are:
• IDs expire after a period of time that can be set by the system designers.
• A claim to own an ID can be verified by any good node.
• The adversary is limited to roughly βn IDs u.a.r. from [0, 1).
These properties are established via a PoW scheme whereby a node must solve a computational puzzle in order to obtain an ID. Given space constraints and that the bulk of our results are proved without the need to reference these details, we delay their discussion until Section 4.
Throughout this paper, we make the random oracle assumption [10] : there exist hash functions, h, such that h(x) is uniformly distributed over h's range, when any x in the domain of h is input to h for the first time. We assume that both the input and output domains are the real numbers between 0 and 1. In practice, h may be a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2 [37], with inputs and outputs of sufficiently large bit lengths
We make use of the following well-known concentration results. [33] ) Let X 1 , . . . , X N be independent indicator random variables such that Pr(X i ) = p and let X = N i=1 X i . For any δ, where 0 < δ < 1, the following holds:
Theorem 1. (Chernoff Bounds
Theorem 2. (Method of Bounded Differences [15] ) Let f be a function of the variables
.., N . Then, the following holds:
Overview and Our Main Result
As discussed above, reducing quorum size is desirable but gives rise to the possibility of bad quorums. In Section 2, we demonstrate how to achieve 1/poly(log n)-robustness with quorums of size Θ(log log n) when there is no churn. This argument leverages the bound on congestion given by the input graph, along with carefully tallying of the fraction of ID space which cannot be searched. This result is applied in Section 3 where we show that 1/poly(log log n)-robustness can be maintained despite churn. A key component of our construction is the use of two graphs (composed of quorums) that, when used in tandem, limit the number of bad quorums that can be formed.
Finally, in Section 4, we describe how PoW is used to provide the guarantees on node IDs discussed in Subsection 1.3. The main challenge is defending against an adversary that wishes to store a large number of IDs for use in a massive future attack (i.e., a pre-computation attack).
Our main result is the following:
Assume an input graph G that satisfies P 1 -P 4. If the adversary has at most βn computational power, then our construction using |Q| = O(log log n) provides the following guarantees w.h.p. over a polynomial number of join and departure events:
• all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of quorums are good.
• all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of nodes can successfully search for all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of the resources.
That is, our construction provides 1/poly(log log n)-robustness. This yields bounds on the cost metrics discussed in Section 1:
• robust computation incurs O(poly(log log n)) message complexity.
• robust routing incurs O(log n poly(log log n)) message complexity.
• expected O(poly(log log n)) state maintenance.
where the cost of state maintenance follows from using a graph G as defined in [18] , [31] , or [36] .
Note that these are substantial improvements over the costs described in Section 1, particularly with respect to robust computation and state maintenance.
Can we do better? A natural question is whether substantially better results are possible and we offer some intuition for why this seems unlikely. With |Q| = Θ(log log n), the probability of a bad quorum is roughly 1/poly(log n). Given that most search algorithms require (roughly) a logarithmic number of hops, the probability of avoiding any bad quorums along the search path is (roughly)
log n 1 1/poly(log n) < 1 by a union bound. Now consider a smaller quorum of size of, say, Θ(log log log n). The probability of a bad quorum is (roughly) 1/poly(log log n) and over a logarithmic number of hops, a union bound fails to offer us a probability less than 1 and routing is likely to fail.
In this sense, our choice of |Q| appears to be pushing the limits of what is possible when designing robust systems with quorums.
Almost-Everywhere Routing -The Static Case
We first prove results for the static case since this is a useful building block for the dynamic case.
The Quorum Graph
Given our input graph G, our approach involves the creation of a quorum graph Q which can be viewed as replacing each vertex w in G with a quorum Q w .
Other aspects are analogous to G. The neighbor set L w consists of quorums as elements. Edges are directed from quorum Q w to quorum Q v -denoted by (Q w , Q v ) -and signifies that Q v ∈ L w . A search in Q proceeds over these edges as it would in G, except that quorums are being traversed instead of individual nodes. The edge directionality indicates the way in which a search traversing Q w proceeds; other communication may occur in both directions. The edge (Q w , Q v ) is realized in the network by all-to-all links between (at least) the good members in Q w and Q v .
For ease of presentation, we often speak of quorums being uniformly distributed in the ID space; by this, we mean the leaders of the quorum are uniformly distributed. Congestion is similarly defined for a quorum graph: the probability that a random lookup traverses a quorum (that is, traverses the leader and, by extension, at least the good members of its quorum).
In proving Q satisfies almost-everywhere routing, we consider the following steps which capture the impact of the adversary:
• S1. Q inherits the properties of the input graph G; each quorum Q w has |L w | neighbors, poly(log n) degree, and Q has congestion C = O(log c n/n) for a constant c ≥ 0.
• S2. Each quorum is red independently with probability p f ≤ 1 log k n for a tunable constant k > 0.
• S3. The adversary adds or deletes edges between red quorums only.
Overview of Analysis. We clarify a few points before presenting our arguments in the next section. A search in Q = (V , E) is said to fail if it traverses any red quorum. Pessimistically, we assume the result of a failed search is dictated by the adversary; otherwise, the search succeeds. Informally, blue quorums correspond to good quorums with their neighbors correctly established, while red quorums correspond to bad quorums or those quorums with at least one incorrect neighbor. The utility of this coloring scheme will become clearer when we address churn in Section 3.2.
The value of p f in S2 corresponds to the probability that a quorum is bad or has at least one incorrect neighbor (i.e., is red). To provide intuition, note that if we select Θ(log log n) nodes u.a.r., then the probability that more than a 1/3-fraction are bad is O(1/poly(log n)) by a Chernoff bound. A similar bound can be derived on the probability of incorrectly setting up neighbors. Keeping p f upper bounded by 1 log k n with churn is non-trivial, and this is argued later in Section 3.2.
Edges in Q are directed from a quorum to its neighbors and a search traverses these edges as it proceeds. In our analysis, special attention is paid to those edges (Q, Q ) such that Q is blue and Q is red; we call Q a border quorum. Informally, border quorums can be viewed as forming a boundary point to the "community" of red quorums and a search that encounters a border quorum fails.
Since the adversary controls all red quorums, it is free to insert or delete edges between red quorums; hence the motivation for S3. However, edges involving at least one blue quorum are not modified. This corresponds to the fact that the adversary cannot modify the blue quorum's notion of who its neighbors are (since this is kept consistent by the good nodes who are in the majority), although the red quorum may certainly ignore or corrupt incoming messages from that blue quorum.
Analysis
In Q, a search starting at any quorum Q i and terminating at the first faulty quorum is a route. Starting at any quorum Q i , the union of all routes induces a search tree; there is one search tree per quorum. 10 For a quorum Q v , we define responsibility of Q v to be the sum over all n search trees, T , of the probability that a search using T for a random point in [0, 1) will traverse Q v (by this, we mean at least the good quorum members partake in the search); denote this by ρ(v). We are interested in the aggregate responsibility of all red quorums. Note that this is equivalent to examining the aggregate responsibility of all border quorums since a search must traverse a border quorum before traversing any other red quorum. Lemma 1. With high probability ρ(v) = O(log c n) for each border quorum Q v .
Proof. By S1, w.h.p. the search in a random tree for a random point will traverse Q v with probability C = O(log c n/n).
For a fixed search tree T , we say that a search for a key value fails if the appropriate route in T traverses a red quorum. Let X be a random variable that is the sum over all search trees, T , of the probability that a search in T for a random key value fails. The randomness of X depends on which quorums are red.
Proof. For some fixed quorum Q v in some fixed search tree, let X v be a random variable that equals ρ(v) if Q v is a border quorum, and 0 otherwise. Note that X ≤ v X v . By linearity of expectation, w.h.p.
f n/ log n) where > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant depending only on n.
Proof. For some fixed quorum Q v in some fixed tree, let X v be a random variable that equals ρ(v) if Q v is a border quorum, and 0 otherwise. We will bound v X v , which is always at least as large as
. Thus, we can apply Theorem 2 with c 2 i = O(log 2c n) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We have that:
Plugging in E(X) = O(p f n log c n) from Lemma 2 yields the result.
Lemma 4. With probability at least 1 − e −O(p 2 f n/ log 2(c+k) n) any search from a random quorum to a random point in [0, 1) succeeds with probability 1 − O(1/ log k−c n) where k ≥ c + 1.
can consider X to be the total space over all search trees that can not be reached because of the red quorums. Hence, if we pick a tree uniformly at random from which to start a search, and search for a random point, then the probability of success is exactly X/n = O(1/ log k−c n) by S2.
3 Almost-Everywhere Routing -The Dynamic Case
We now consider the case where nodes can join and depart the system. Time is divided into disjoint consecutive windows of T time steps called epochs indexed by j ≥ 1; we discuss the setting of T further in Subection 4.1. In any epoch j, there are:
• two old quorum graphs Q j−1 1 and Q j−1 2 , each with n nodes.
• two new quorum graphs Q j 1 and Q j 2 , each with at most n nodes.
We emphasize that the use of two quorum graphs per epoch is critical. A naive approach is to use a single quorum graph in the current epoch in order to build a new quorum graph in the next epoch. However, this approach will fail because errors from bad quorums will accumulate over time and we give some intuition for why. (3) A sketch of the search tree for node w. (4) A grouping of quorums into good and bad communities. The edge (Q v , Q y ) bridges the community and any search that traverses this edge from the blue community is assumed to fail. Quorum Q y is a border quorum.
Informally, in epoch i, we have a process where (1) bad quorums build new bad quorums, and (2) good quorums build bad quorums with some failure probability p i f > 0 that depends on the current number of bad quorums. Therefore, in the next epoch i + 1, the population of bad quorums has increased and so has p i+1 f . This increasing error probability will continue until a constant fraction of the quorums are bad (instead of the desired 1/poly(log n) fraction).
By using two quorum graphs, we can upper bound p i f for all i. In particular, we bound this error as
as this is necessary to invoke our result for the static case (recall S2 in Sectino 2). The new quorum graphs are built using the old quorum graphs over the n deletions and additions that occur in the current epoch j; we describe this in Subsection 3. 
Building New Quorum Graphs
We describe how the new quorum graphs Q j 1 and Q j 2 are created. Then, in Section 3.2, we prove that w.h.p. this construction preserves almost-everywhere routing.
Preliminaries. Over the T steps of epoch j − 1, nodes that wish to participate in the system join. 11 These new nodes will be able to use the system in epoch j. Nodes are assumed to know when the system came online (i.e. step 0). 12 Since T is set when the system is designed, any node that wishes to join knows when the current epoch ends and the next one begins.
For now, we assume each good node possesses a single ID which is valid for the T steps of the current epoch. After the epoch comes to an end, each node must obtain a new ID for use in the next epoch. The details of how this is performed and enforced are given later in Section 4; for now, we assume these properties for IDs exist.
Each good node v maintains the same ID in Q j−1 1 and Q j−1 2 . Recall from Section 1.3 that IDs expire after a tunable period of time. Prior to this expiration, Q v is said to be active and it can initiate searches. When v's ID expires, its quorum Q v (this includes v) should remain in both old graphs for an additional T steps. During these steps, Q v will forward communications but it cannot initiate searches; we say that Q v is passive.
A new node w with a random ID is bootstrapped into the new quorum graph by a bootstrapping quorum denoted by Q boot . Throughout, we assume that a joining node knows a good bootstrapping quorum; we discuss this further in the Appendix D.
Making a Quorum-Member Request. In Q
A similar process occurs to form the quorums for Q w in Q j−1 2 , except that a different secure hash function h 2 is used. Therefore, the membership of Q w is likely different in each quorum graph.
Making a Neighbor Request. If w and u are neighbors in the input graph, then Q w and Q u should be neighbors in the quorum graph (recall that this entails all-to-all links between the members of both quorums). By property P3 of the input graph G, each node u ∈ L w is dictated by w's ID. On behalf of w, Q boot performs a search to locate each such neighbor u. In this way, Q boot allows u (and Q u ) to learn about w and agree to set up a link in the respective quorum graph.
Verifying Requests. The adversary may attempt to have many good nodes join as neighbors or members of a bad quorum. This attack is problematic since good nodes have their resources consumed by maintaining too many neighbors or joining too many quorums; that is, this attack increases the state cost (see Section 1). Therefore, any such request must be verified: Verifying a Quorum-Membership Request. When node u is asked to become a member of quorum Q w , node u first checks whether h 1 (w, i) for the appropriate i (that accompanies the request) has a value which is within [u − (c ln n)/n, u) for a constant c > 0 sufficiently large (we relax notation such that u refers to the name of the node as well as its ID value). If h 1 (w, i) does not fall within this distance, then u immediately rejects the request.
Else, u verifies the request by performing a search on h 1 (w, i). If this returns u, then the request is considered verified and u becomes a neighbor of w; otherwise, the request is rejected. The correctness of the quorum construction is argued in Lemma 7 and the bound on state cost maintained by this verification procedure is given in Lemma 10. Verifying a Neighbor Request. A node u that is asked to become a neighbor of node w (and thus establish links between the members of Q u and Q w ) must verify the request. Recall that by property P3 of the input graph, u can determine independently by a search whether u should indeed be a neighbor of w. If this search returns u, then the request is verified and u becomes a neighbor of w; otherwise, the request is rejected. The correctness of the resulting neighbor set is argued in Lemma 8 and the bound on state cost for this verification procedure is given in Lemma 10.
Performing a
2 . This is done by forwarding the request to Q boot and forwarding on the search from that position. Since Q boot was active when w joined, Q boot will remain in the system -perhaps in a passive state -to facilitate searches in the old quorum graphs for another T steps. After this point, Q j 1 and Q j 2 are complete and w may issue its own searches using these quorum graphs.
Why must w forward its request through Q boot ? Over the duration of epoch j, the new quorum graphs are still under construction. In an extreme case, for example, w might be the first node to join Q 2 . This is also true if a new node decides to depart a new quorum graph (even before its completed).
Once epoch j + 1 starts, the new quorum graphs Q j 1 and Q j 2 are to be used. At this point, Q w will initiate any search using its own links in these graphs (rather than relying on Q boot which may no longer be present in the system).
Analysis
In this section, we prove that old quorum graphs satisfying S1, S2 and S3 can be used to construct new quorum graphs that preserve S1, S2, and S3. Due to space constraints, some proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Properties P1-P4 of input graph G are critical to our arguments. However, a prerequisite to these properties is that all IDs are selected uniformly at random (see Section 1.3) which is untrue if the adversary chooses to add only some of its bad nodes; for example, maybe only bad nodes with IDs in [0, In the following, we may consider G to be a modified input graph which uses the same construction as G, but is subject to an adversary that only includes a subset of its nodes (from a larger set of nodes with u.a.r. IDs).
Lemma 5. Consider a graph G where the nodes are formed from two sets:
• N 1 consists of at least (1 − β)n nodes with IDs selected u.a.r. from [0, 1).
• N 2 is an arbitrary subset of at most βn nodes with IDs selected u.a.r. from [0, 1).
W.h.p., under the same construction as the input graph G, graph G has properties P1 -P4.
Throughout, the above result is assumed -that properties P1-P4 continue to hold if the adversary includes only a subset of its IDs -even if we do not always make it explicit (for example, P1 is used throughout, P2 is used in Lemma 6, P4 in Lemma 9, and P3 in Lemma 10).
As described above, a node u performs searches on random key values (via hashing under the random oracle assumption) in order to locate members for a new quorum Q. But if that key value maps to a bad node, then this results in a bad member being added to the quorum. We can bound the probability of this event:
Lemma 6. W.h.p. a random key value in an old quorum graph maps to a bad node with probability at most (1 + δ )β for an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 depending only on sufficiently large n.
In the following, let q f = O(1/ log k−c n) be the probability that a search for a random key in an old quorum graph Q j−1 i fails; this is dictated by Lemma 4. Recall that a quorum Q is good if d 1 ln ln n ≤ |Q| ≤ d 2 ln ln n members, for constants d 1 < d 2 , and at most |Q|/3 members are bad.
Lemma 7.
A new quorum is bad with probability at most q 2 f d 2 ln ln n + 1/ log d n for a tunable constant
Proof. For a new node w, there are two ways in which building Q w may fail. First, a search for a quorum member may fail (i.e., encounters a bad quorum). Given a point h 1 (w, i), the probability that both searches in Q 1 and Q 2 fail is at most q 2 f . By a union bound, the probability of such a dual failure occurring over d 2 ln ln n searchers is at most q 2 f d 2 ln ln n. Second, the search succeeds but returns suc(h(w, i)) where suc(h(w, i)) is a bad node (even though its quorum has a good majority). Since h(w, i) is a random point (under the random oracle assumption), this event occurs with probability at most (1 + δ)β by Lemma 6 for an arbitrarily small constant > 0 given sufficiently large n.
Over d 2 ln ln n searches, the expected number of such events is at most (1+δ)βd 2 ln ln n. The probability of exceeding this expectation by more than a small constant factor is 1/ log d n by a Chernoff bound where the constant d > 0 is tunable depending only on sufficiently large d 2 .
A quorum Q w should link to all quorums with leaders in the neighbor set L w as dictated by the input graph G. If Q w (1) links to any quorum whose leader is not in L w , or (2) fails to link to any quorum whose leader is in L w , then Q w is said to be confused. We now bound the probability of a confused quorum being created.
Lemma 8. Each quorum in a new quorum graph is confused independently with probability at most q 2 f .
Proof. Since the bootstrapping quorum is good, the only ways in which a quorum is confused is if the two searches for a neighbor point in the old quorum graph Q i both fail. Applying Lemma 4, this occurs with probability at most q 2 f .
We are now ready to prove that w.h.p. each new quorum graph is almost-everywhere routable.
Lemma 9. Assume that the adversary adds at most (1 + )βn nodes with u.a.r. IDs to a new quorum graph for an arbitrarily small constant > 0 depending only on sufficiently large n. Then, w.h.p., each new quorum graph is almost-everywhere routable.
Proof. To prove this result, we demonstrate equivalence between the construction of a new quorum graph and steps S1, S2, and S3 in Section 2. Recall the terminology in Section 2 and designate all bad quorums and confused quorums as red, and all other quorums as blue. Equivalence to S1. By assumption, the adversary has at most (1 + )βn u.a.r IDs. The good nodes also have u.a.r. IDs. Using all of these IDs would give congestion C corresponding to the input graph G and thus step S1 would be satisfied. However, the adversary may choose to employ only a subset of its IDs -how does this affect the congestion? By Lemma 5, the resulting congestion is O(C) and we have equivalence with S1 up to a constant factor (which does not affect the argument in Lemma 4). 13 Equivalence to S2. Satisfying S2 requires enforcing that for each construction of a new quorum graph, the probability of a red quorum is at most p f ≤ 1/ log k n for a tunable constant k > 0. By Lemmas 7 and 8, each quorum is red independently with probability at most:
The last line follows by setting d 2 to be sufficiently large such that d exceeds 2(k − c); note d 2 is fixed at the beginning and never needs to be changed throughout the lifetime of the network. Then, setting k > 2c to be a sufficiently large constant yields the necessary inequality with p f .
Equivalence to S3. The incorrect link structure of confused quorums corresponds to step S3.
Finally, Lemma 4 applies to the new quorum graph and competes the proof.
We now prove bounds on the number links a good node needs to maintain due to (1) membership in quorums, and (2) being a neighbor of a quorum. This is done by analyzing the verification process described in Section 3.1.
Lemma 10. In expectation, each good node w in a quorum graph is a member of O(log log n) quorums and maintains state on O(|L w |) quorums that are either neighbors or have w as a neighbor. Figure 3 : Evaluation of almost-everywhere routing in the Distance-Halving Construction [36] and Linearized De Bruijn network [38] .
Fraction of Searchable Quorums
We can now prove Theorem 3:
Proof. By Lemma 7, all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of quorums are good. It follows that for each good quorum, executing a BA or secure multiparty computation schemes that incur poly(|Q|) message complexity (discussed in Section 1) have poly(log log n) message complexity.
By Lemma 9, all but a 1/polylog n-fraction of nodes can successfully search for all but a 1/polylog nfraction of the resources.
Given that robust routing proceeds all-to-all between quorums and that searches have maximum length D = O(log n) (recall P1 in Section 1.3), the message complexity is O(log n (log log n) 2 ).
To bound the state cost, we invoke Lemma 10. Each good node w belongs to O(log log n) quorums in expectation which implies O((log log n) 2 ) expected state cost. Additionally, in terms of neighbors, w has links (to or from) O(poly(log n)) quorums. The constructions for G defined in [36] , [18] , or [31] provide the properties P1-P4, but provide a better bound of O(1) expected degree. Using any such construction allows for a state cost of O(log log n) in expectation. Therefore, the total state cost is O((log log n) 2 ) + O(log log n) = O((log log n) 2 ).
Experiments on Almost-Everywhere Routing
To investigate the effectiveness of our almost-everywhere routing guarantee, we simulated two DHT constructions: The Distance-Halving (DH) construction [36] and the Linearized De-Bruijn (LDB) network [38] . The DH construction is interesting because it offers O(1) expected degree, O(log n) search latency, and has w.h.p. expected congestion O(log 2 n/n) (see [4] ). The LDB network does not (to our knowledge) have a congestion bound, but it does offer O(1) degree (not just in expectation) in addition to a O(log n) search latency. This bound on degree is useful since it means that all quorums then possess poly(log log n) state overall in the quorum graph, whereas with the DH construction, a small number of quorums will have Θ(log n) degree and thus have poly(log n) state.
The quorums in our simulations are programmed to be bad with probability 1/(c ln n) k , where c = 13/100 and k = 28. This yields a probability ≈ 0.33 for n = 3, 000 and a probability ≈ 0.0003 for n = 30, 000. These parameters c and k were chosen to clearly illustrate the effect of n on our almosteverywhere routing guarantee.
We measure the fraction of quorums in the system that are routable by a search operation from a single source quorum; that is, no bad quorum is encountered on the search path from source to destination. For each construction, we tested 15 DHTs per n value and a sample size of 15 source quorums per DHT was used.
The experimental results are plotted in Figure 3 , along with error analysis using a 95% confidence interval. The simulation was implemented with the Java programming language, and the plots were generated using MATLAB. The experiment was executed on an Acer Aspire F5-573G laptop with a Windows 10 Operating System, Intel Core i5 CPU, 64-bit Operating System, 8GB RAM, with a 2.30GHz processor.
For the DH construction, the fraction of routable quorums at n = 3, 000 quorums was 0.0144 while the fraction of routable quorums at n = 30, 000 quorums was 0.9964. Therefore, as n increases, the almosteverywhere routing property improves dramatically. Similarly, for the LDB network, the fraction of routable quorums at n = 3000 quorums was 0.0516 while the fraction of routable quorums at n = 30, 000 quorums was 0.9646.
Computational Puzzles
Up to this point, we have assumed that the adversary can inject into each new quorum graph at most (1 + )βn bad nodes with u.a.r. IDs, and that these IDs can be verified and forced to expire after a period of time (Section 1.3). Given space constraints, we limit our discussion to the main ideas of how to use computation puzzles to guarantee these properties.
Generating an ID
All nodes are assumed to know two secure hash functions, f and g, with range and domain [0, 1) and that both hash functions satisfy the random oracle assumption.
In the current epoch i, node w is assumed to possess a "globally-known" random string r i−1 of ln n bits. By "globally-known", we mean known to all good nodes except the 1/poly(log n)-fraction from our earlier analysis. We motivate r i−1 and describe how it is generated in Subsection 4.2.
Starting at step T /2 in the current epoch, each good node begins generating a new ID for use in the next epoch (see Subsection 4.2) as described below.
Generating an ID. To generate an ID, a good node w selects a value σ w of ln n random bits (matching the length of r i−1 ). Then, w XORs these two strings to get σ w ⊕ r i−1 , and checks if g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 ) ≤ τ . We assume the value τ is set small enough such that w.h.p. a node requires (1 ± )T /2 time steps to find a σ w that satisfies this inequality, where > 0 is a tunable (small) positive constant and T > 0 is a parameter set when the system is initialized.
We remark that the use of two secure hash functions is not immediately apparent. We justify this design choice below in Lemma 11 when we prove a bound on the adversary's ability to generate IDs.
Observe that T is roughly the maximum session time for any node since its ID is valid for this number of steps; after this, a node must obtain a new ID (although the node, along with its quorum, may remain in a passive state for an additional T steps using this ID). However, T can be set to a large value so that this forced churn is spread out over long periods of time to avoid negatively impacting performance. Given that the designers can estimate the rate of churn for their application and set a (loose) upper bound on n, then they can set T accordingly.
Finally, we note that the adversary may attempt to generate IDs throughout the entire epoch rather than stopping after T /2 steps. At worst, the adversary may then actually be in possession of roughly 2 βn IDs. Figure 4 : Depiction of the timeline for epochs j and j + 1. The first T /2 steps are dedicated to generating a random string which is used for input into the ID generation step; these details are described later in Section 4. Given this random string, the generation of an ID takes place over the second T /2 steps of each epoch. Each ID is valid over the T time steps of the succeeding epoch.
We can address this problem by revising the value of β such that β < 1/8 which then allows us to recapture the bound that less than n/4 IDs in the system are bad (recall from Section 1.3 that we are not optimizing β, and we only care about tolerating an adversary with Θ(n) computational power) and so we omit further discussion of this issue.
Why Use Two Hash Functions? Consider using a single secure hash function f to assign IDs; that is, if f (x) < τ , then x is a valid ID. In this case, the adversary has a strategy where it may restrict itself to small inputs x in order to confine its solutions to yielding small IDs. In other words, the IDs obtained by the adversary will not be u.a.r. from [0, 1). This motivates the use of composing two secure hash functions, f and g, as described above. We prove the following:
Lemma 11. W.h.p., the adversary can generate at most (1 + )βn IDs per epoch and these IDs are uniform at random in [0, 1).
Proof. Since the adversary has βn computational power to expend over this epoch, w.h.p. it can generate at most (1 + )βn solutions σ v such that g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 ) ≤ τ within an epoch where the constant > 0 is can be made arbitrarily small depending only on sufficiently large n. By the random oracle assumption, applying f to these solutions yields at most (1 + )βn IDs.
ID Verification. Upon receiving a message from some node w, a good node u verifies w's ID. This could be done naively by having w send σ w to u who checks that g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 ) ≤ τ and that f (g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 )) evaluates correctly to the claimed ID (note that u already has r i since it is globally-known). Unfortunately, this allows u to steal σ w if u is bad.
To avoid this issue, we assume a zero-knowledge scheme for revealing the pre-image of the hashing; such a scheme is provided for the SHA family [22] . This allows w to prove the validity of σ w without revealing it.
If w's ID cannot be verified, then u simply ignores w going forward. Note that w's current ID will not be valid in the next epoch since it is signed by the older string r i−1 (rather than the next globally-known random string r i ); that is, w's ID will have expired. Nodes with IDs that are not verified are effectively removed from the system; that is, they may consort with bad nodes, but they have no interactions with good nodes.
Generating Global Random Strings
Imagine if no random string was used in the creation of IDs described above in Subsection 4.1. The adversary would know the format of the ID-generation puzzles, and so could spend time computing a large number of IDs, and then use these IDs all at once to overwhelm the system at some future point. This is a precomputation attack.
Signing IDs with a random string prevents such an attack as it is impossible for the adversary to know far in advance how to generate identifiers. We provide a scheme where random strings are generated and propagated throughout the network in order to be used in ID generation and, consequently, safeguard against a pre-computation attack.
Due to space constraints, this content is provided in Appendix B. Our main result is:
Lemma 12. W.h.p., the protocol for propagating strings (i) guarantees that, for each good node w, its string used for generating an ID is known is to each good node, (ii) the number of strings stored by each node is O(ln n), and (iii) has message complexityÕ(n ln T ).
We note that, averaged out over the epoch, this message complexity is low.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have argued that quorums of size O(log log n) can be used to tolerate a powerful adversary that controls a constant fraction of the computing resources in the network. Intuition is also provided as to why this seems to be (roughly) the smallest quorum size that leads to a useful robustness result. A portion of our result relies on PoW techniques to limit the number of IDs the adversary controls. While it is interesting that these techniques can be leveraged to greatly reduce quorum size -yielding the consequent savings in message complexity and state maintenance -an open question is whether the computational costs for the PoW component can be reduced. Might there be a way to avoid the constant solving of puzzles? Is there an approach that would only utilize puzzle solving when the system is determined to be under attack? over at most n nodes, there are O(log 2 n) valid requests received by w; this is tight by a standard Chernoff bound.
It follows that w accepts at most O(log 2 n)/poly(log n) = o(log log n) erroneous requests in expectation so long as our constant k is sufficiently large.
State Cost of w's Neighbors. This is straightforward: recall by property P3 of the input graph G, that w links to O(|L w |) other nodes. Therefore, in each quorum graph, w links to O(|L w |) = O(poly(log n)) quorums as neighbors.
State Cost of Neighbor Requests. Via Lemma 5, properties P1 and P3 guarantees that w can determine independently whether it should indeed be a neighbor of some node u, and there are at most poly(log n) such nodes u. Using the old quorum graphs, wherein almost-everywhere routing is guaranteed w.h.p., w initiates a search to check that it should indeed be a neighbor. With a tunable probability at least 1 − O(1/ log k−c n) node w can detect if the request is erroneous. Therefore, in expectation, the number of erroneous acceptances is at most o(|L w |) so long as our constant k is sufficiently large (recall Lemma 4).
B Generating Global Random Strings
Generating Global Random Strings. During epoch i, each node w forms a solution set of the d 0 ln n smallest random strings R w i for some constant d 0 ≥ 1. Over epoch i, all good nodes generate random strings and the smallest are collected independently by each node w to create R w i . To generate a string in epoch i, a node w uses a string r i−1 -the globally-known string from the previous epoch -and an individually generated random string, s w , to compute the output t w = h(s w ⊕ r i−1 ).
Bins and Counters. To facilitate our discussion of how to propagate strings and ease our subsequent analysis, we describe a system of bins and counters maintained by each good node w. The bins B j correspond to intervals in the ID space where B j = [1/2 j , 1/2 j−1 ) for j = 1, 2, ..., b ln(n T ) where b ≥ 1 is a sufficiently large constant. Since T is known and there are standard techniques for obtaining a constant-factor approximation to ln n, calculating ln(nT ) = ln(n) + ln(T ) to within a constant factor is possible. 14 Each bin B j has an associated counter C j . Consider that w receives a string s u with corresponding output t u that falls within the interval defined by B j ; we say that B j contains s u . If t u is smaller than the other values w has seen so far contained in B j , and C j ≤ c 0 ln n for some sufficiently large constant c 0 ≥ 1, then w increments C j and forwards s u onto its neighbors. After C j = c 0 ln n, no value landing within B j is ever forwarded.
The intuition is that, if c ln n strings are found with "record-breaking" outputs in B j , then w.h.p. smaller strings exist with outputs belonging to B j+1 . In other words, those strings corresponding to B j will not be candidates a globally-known string and so they can be ignored.
Protocol for Propagating Strings. The propagation of strings is broken into phases which make up the first half of an epoch. We describe the protocol for good nodes (although bad nodes can deviate arbitrarily).
Phase 1 executes over steps 1 to T /2 − 2d ln n for a constant d > 1 of the current epoch i. Over this time, each node w generates random strings with associated outputs. After Phase 1 ends, nodes no longer generate new random strings.
Phase 2 begins at step T /2 − 2d ln n + 1 and runs for d ln n steps. Each node w (using its quorum Q w ) selects the string s min w with the smallest output t min w that was generated in Phase 1, and then sends s min w its neighbors. Node w updates the corresponding bin and counter, as described earlier.
Each neighbor u verifies s min w . Using t min w , node u decides whether to forward s min w to its own neighbors (except for w) and, if so, updates the corresponding bin and counter; otherwise, u ignores this value. At the 14 A standard technique for estimating ln n to within a constant factor is as follows. For nodes with u.a.r. IDs, the distance d (u, v) between any two nodes u and v satisfies w.h.p. that can be tuned depending only on sufficiently large positive constants c , c Therefore, with high probability, ln(
) = Θ(ln n) and this holds even when an adversary decides to omit its nodes in the ID space (see Chapter 4 in [48] ). end of Phase 2, each node w selects the string with the smallest output it has seen so far; this is denoted by s i * w .
Phase 3 starts at step T /2 − d ln n + 1 and runs for the final d ln n steps. Over these steps, nodes no longer generate new strings, although they will still propagate them according to the above rules.
At the end of the phase, each node w creates its solution set R w i in the following way. Node w finds the largest j for which B j contains at least one element. Then, w takes the union of subsequent bins for decreasing j until there are d 0 ln n elements; the collection of these elements form R w i . This concludes the propagation protocol. We note that immediately (starting at step T /2 + 1) node w will start generating a new ID signed with the string s i * w chosen in Phase 2. Discussion. The adversary may prevent good nodes from agreeing on the same solution set. As mentioned in Subsection 4.1, a 1/poly(log n)-fraction may be unable to partake in the propagation process even with our robust routing, and their loss is already incorporated into our analysis in Subsection 3.2. Therefore, we address the giant component of (1 − 1/poly(log n))n good nodes that can reach each other (and this set of nodes is implied by the terminology "good nodes").
The critical source of disagreement between good nodes is that the adversary may delay releasing a string s (or multiple strings) with a small output. For example, if this occurs right before the end of Phase 2, then only a subset of good nodes receive s and their respective solution sets differ from the other good nodes. In this way, two good nodes u and w can choose different strings s i * u and s i * w . We sketch how this disagreement is handled, but first we address the simpler case where there is no adversarial interference. With No Adversary: Note that the propagation of a string in the giant component requires at most d ln n steps. Therefore, since all nodes send their string at the beginning of Phase 1, then by the end of Phase 2, all nodes accept the same set of strings and agree on the minimum string.
Furthermore, in Phase 3, nothing will occur (since no strings are released late) and so any nodes w and u are guaranteed w.h.p. to have R w i = R u i . What are the outputs corresponding to these solution sets? There are Θ(n) nodes computing for Θ(T ) steps, so the smallest output in a set R w i is Θ( 1 nT ) and w.h.p. no larger than O( ln n nT ). With an Adversary: The adversary can propagate a string s with a small output late in Phase 2. 15 If w receives s while u does not, then R w i = R u i . We argue that (1) the size of each solution set remains bounded by Θ(ln n), and (2) that the string s i * w used by each good node w belongs to every other good nodes' solution set; these two properties enable efficient and correct verification (described below). How many solutions s could w receive and add to R w i ? As noted above, this solution set will hold outputs of value O( ln n nT ). Since the adversary has bounded computational power of βn, w.h.p. there cannot be more than d ln n solutions with output value Θ( 1 nT ) for some constant d > 0. This is true even if the adversary computes over the entire epoch. We set the constant c 0 used in the bin counters such that c 0 ≥ d in order to make sure that no smallest values are omitted. Now assume that w selects s i * w , but that s i * w is not present in good node u's solution set R u i ; we will derive a contradiction. If s i * w originated from a good node, then u received s i * w by the end of Phase 3 since 2d ln n steps is more then sufficient for the propagation of a string in the giant component. Else, s i * w originated from the adversary. Since s i * w was held by w by the end of Phase 2, the addition d ln n steps in Phase 3 would have allowed s i * w to reach u and be added to R u i . In either case, this yields the contradiction. Finally, what is the message complexity of the propagation protocol? Recall that for each bin, the associated counter restricts to O(ln n) the number of times a node forwards a string to its neighbors. Given that there are O(ln(nT )) bins, the total number of times a node can forward a string is O(ln(n) ln(nT )). The number of messages sent between any pair of neighboring quorums is O(|Q| 2 ) = O((log log n) 2 ) and the degree in the quorum graph is O(poly(log n)). Therefore, the total message complexity over O(n) nodes isÕ(n ln T ) whereÕ accounts for poly(log n) terms.
The above discussion supports the following: Lemma 12. With high probability, the protocol for propagating strings (i) guarantees that, for each good node w in the component, s i * w is contained within the solution set of every good node in the component, (ii) |R w i | = O(ln n), and (iii) has message complexityÕ(n ln T ). Verifying IDs. For simplicity, our discussion of ID verification in Subsection 4.1 assumed that a single r i−1 was agreed upon. However, not much changes when using solution sets.
To generate an ID for use in epoch i + 1, node w uses s i * w to sign its ID. By the above discussion, we are guaranteed w.h.p. that s i * w belongs to the solution set of each good node. Therefore, a good node u that wishes to verify w's new ID checks whether this ID was signed by any of the strings in R u i ; this requires checking only O(ln n) elements by the above discussion.
C Membership in L u
In our discussion of the properties of the input graph in Section 1.3, we made the following statement in P 3: "... there are O(poly(log N )) nodes u whose IDs dictate w ∈ L u ". We discuss this here further using Chord as an example; however, the same property holds for the other input graphs we specify in Section 1.3.
We consider the version of Chord where IDs are in [0, 1). Node u has neighbors (in its "Finger Table" ) that are found by taking points 2 −i and linking to the successor of each such point, for i = 1, ..., O(lg(N )). Therefore, if u is claiming w as a neighbor, then w can examine the index i and immediately determine if u + 2 −i is "close enough" to w. For example, if u + 2 −i = 0.5, but w = 0.9, then clearly the successor u + 2 −i will not be w and the request is erroneous.
How close is "close enough" such that w must perform a search? Since IDs are u.a.r. in [0, 1), it is easy to see that w.h.p. the largest interval between any two nodes is Θ(log N/N ). Therefore, if u + 2 −i is outside of the subinterval [w − Θ(log N/N ), w), then w can ignore the request. Otherwise, it must perform a search to see if the successor of u + 2 −i is indeed w.
How many nodes have a neighbor link that falls into this interval [w − Θ(log N/N ), w) and cannot be rejected out of hand? Again, a standard argument can be made that O(log N ) nodes fall within any interval of this size, and this is tight w.h.p. by a Chernoff bound; a request from each such node must be checked via a search. Since the degree of each node has degree poly(log N ), this means that only O(poly(log N )) nodes can make neighbor requests as claimed.
D Bootstrapping Quorums
A standard assumption in the literature is that a node knows how to contact another node already in the system in order to be bootstrapped. In the absence of an adversary, this seems plausible and the assumption holds true in practice.
The bootstrapping issue is less clear in a Byzantine setting and we consider it an open challenge, although not within the scope of our work here. We can imagine that a node might know (i.e. have IP addresses and port numbers) for an entire quorum which can then act as Q boot . However, it is unclear how this information would be provided.
If the information is advertised on a server, then this becomes a point of attack. Alternatively, if this information is hard-coded into the application that is downloaded onto the node, then we must rely on someone to do the hard-coding. Or perhaps another distributed system is in place to facilitate bootstrapping akin to Vuze for BitTorrent, but then that system must also be Byzantine fault tolerant.
Note that these issues arise whether all quorums are good, or "almost all" quorums are good. We conjecture that a solution is possible via PoW -having a quorum be able to offer a bootstrapping service only if it solves a puzzle -but we leave this issue to future work.
